KURDISTAN NEWSLINE

Special Dispatch, August 6, 2002

KURDISH LEADER WELCOMES NEW UN COORDINATOR

NEW MEMORANDUM TO THE UNITED NATIONS FROM KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

Sulaimani, August 5 – The Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani received a United Nations delegation headed by Ramiro Armando de Oliveira Lopes da Silva, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for the Oil-for-Food Program, accompanied by Lloyd Adam, Special Assistant to the Coordinator, Tisvay Maro , Deputy to the Coordinator in Iraqi Kurdistan and a number of other officials. Mr. Talabani warmly welcomed Mr. Lopes da Silva on his visit to the Kurdistan region and the start of his new assignment as the UN Humanitarian Coordinator. The Kurdish leader also expressed his hopes that the United Nations implementation team would focus on the development needs of the region, especially the infrastructure needs of the Garmian and Halabja areas, which were devastated in the past as the result of being subjected to the genocidal chemical attacks and Anfal Campaign.

The Kurdistan Regional Government has prepared a memorandum, which will be presented to the United Nations visiting delegation outlining the regional perspective on status of the Security Council Resolution 986 and the 13% Account allocated to the Kurdistan region within the Oil-for-Food Program and the priorities recommended to make the implementation process more effective and to alleviate the urgent needs of the community.

Text of the Memorandum:

Kurdistan Regional Government
Council of Ministers
Memorandum

August 6, 2002

Introduction

First of all, a very warm welcome to Sulaimani, the cultural capital of Kurdistan. We are pleased to have you here and wish you success in your humanitarian journey to our land. We firmly believe that your success is our success. While we look forward that you will work toward achieving the multiple aims of the program, you may also count on us for any assistance that we are able to give to bring success to the currently ongoing humanitarian program in our area.

Background Information

This being your first trip here, we find it appropriate to give you a brief background on our land and the people who live here. Our land has been badly damaged by continuing conflict during most of the past 40 years. In the process close to 2500 villages were destroyed, forests were burned, orchards uprooted, and springs and water sources were devastated. During the Anfal Campaign[1], 182,000 men, women and children lost their lives, as they were driven to destinations hitherto unknown. Meanwhile, thousands of other rural residents were relocated into collective towns. These became dependent on the government handouts for their daily living. Such was the situation at the end of the Gulf war till our people, helped by the allied forces, finally took the reign of power in March 1992, and set up its own administration in most of the region we know as Iraqi Kurdistan.
The Situation Immediately After the Gulf War

Unfortunately, the situation immediately after the Gulf war was unenviable. The Kurdish Government inherited a ruined infrastructure. Governmental and residential buildings were in shambles; schools and health centers were devastated, and the general economy of the people was in a bad shape. Food prices were high and staff salaries were low, since no funds were paid from the central government. Thousands of the Kurdish residents opted for migration, a phenomenon hitherto unknown in our culture. This period lasted for almost 5 years when finally, early in 1997, the UNSCR 986) Oil-for-Food Program, became effective. The first food shipment arrived in the spring of 1997.

The Oil for Food program
Along with the issuance of the USCR986, a Memorandum of Understanding was also signed, allocating 13% of the total oil revenue for the humanitarian assistance of the Kurdish region, to be administered by the United Nations specialized agencies, under close scrutiny of the Iraqi Government.

The Iraqi people, especially the vast majority of the Kurds who faced double sanctions, welcomed the initiation of the Oil-for-Food Program. The food situation was critical and import of food items under the program saved thousands of lives. The most vulnerable groups were the middle class government wage earners who could not cope with highly inflated prices, and the internally displaced people who had no source of income to sustain their daily life. Further as medicines started to arrive, the health situation became less critical. There had been few outbreaks of cholera in some parts of Kurdistan. This was due to the unsanitary situation of existing open sewage, and low resistance of the population due to malnutrition. Therefore the initiation of the Oil- for-Food-Program was a welcome event in the lives of the Iraqi people.

I. Issues Common to all Sectors
Implementation:
Six years into the implementation of the UNSCR986 Program, it has become obvious that a serious review is in order. The implementation procedure has proved to be cumbersome, slowed by UN inefficiencies, full of contradictions that require a major overhaul. Examples of such contradictions are as follows:

· While the program was initiated to carry out required rehabilitation in all sectors, non-procurement of the local agricultural products has paralyzed rehabilitation of countryside, as many of our villages remain in ruin.

· The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), being part of the general structure of Iraq, should assume a greater role in the implementation process. Its role in the implementation process should not be any less than what is allowed for the GOI.

· A third contradiction is allowing Iraq authority to interfere in the implementation process through denial of visas to specific technical staff required to implement the program. A further interference is in the changing of budgetary allocations within the distribution plan that are agreed upon between KRG authorities and UN specialized agencies.

· The OIP should apply stringent management style on the UN agencies operating in areas under the KRG. UNOHCI’s role in the implementation process is minimal, as it has limited authority vis-à-vis the UN specialized agencies’ operations. The management style of each agency varies widely, depending on the Officer in Charge of a specific agency. We believe that UNOHCI should be given a wider role than what it has been given at present.

The following issues deserve special review to steer the program to its true humanitarian course:

Issue # 1
Non-procurement of Local Products:

While the Oil-for-Food Program, UNSCR 986, has been effective in eliminating hunger in Iraqi Kurdistan, the same resolution prohibiting procurement of the local product has been detrimental to the revival of the agriculture sector. Importing of basic food needs of the population and its free distribution to the Iraqi population have killed farmers’ enthusiasm to return to their farms and to become serious food producers. Lack of markets for local products has delayed the return of the farmers to their villages, decreased local production, and has led to increased unemployment in the region. This slump in the agricultural economy has caused many to emigrate in order to find a suitable job abroad. It defies the common logic to import peoples’ needs of agricultural products from abroad when such products are locally available, and at lower cost. During the 12 Phases of the program, close to US $2.0 Billion have been expended for importing agricultural items 90% of which could have been locally procured at a much lower prices. (Please see Appendix 1 Attached)

Issue# 2
The Problem of the Recurrent Costs
Revenue from the sale of oil has always been the major source of budgetary allocation to all sectors of Iraqi public activities. Staff salaries, per diems, office equipment, training needs, local or overseas travel, transport facilities, maintenance needs of public equipment and vehicles, and every other needs regarding internal security and public transport were again paid from allocations assigned to the designated sector from revenues received from the sale of oil. Agricultural and industrial exports formed but a small share of the Iraqi economy.

Since the withdrawal of the Iraqi authorities from Kurdistan, the GOI has stopped staff salaries and other payments required for the recurrent costs. While the GOI has varied sources of revenues to pay for its required recurrent costs, the KRG administered region is particularly disadvantaged vis-à-vis sources of revenue, making payments for recurrent cost extremely difficult. Further, under the sanction regime, revenues received from the sale of oil have been diverted to the United Nations. Such a state of affairs has compounded the smooth functioning of a normal administrative operation and in its active participation in UN agencies’ program implementation. An average paid salary does not exceed the equivalent of US $20/month that has been one of the major destabilizing factors of our communities and has forced the people to opt for migration.

It is imperative that required adjustment should be made in the Oil-for-Food Program to seriously address this issue and allow for phase-wise budgetary allocation for the payment of recurrent costs, as required by every sector of the public domain. Local taxation or other revenues received from the sale of limited industrial products is insufficient to cover such costs.

ISSUE # 3
Rehabilitation versus Development?

The UNSC passed its Resolution 986, to face an emergency situation immediately in the aftermath of the Gulf war, to mainly address the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people for food and medicine, and limited emergency rehabilitation works. It was a temporary measure to meet the immediate needs of the Iraqi population. At the time it was thought that perhaps a phase or two of the program would suffice to address the needs of the population.

However, unknown to the initiators of the Resolution, the program has lasted for a longer period than originally thought, currently at its 12th Phase, and that monies generated exceeds the sole need of food and medicine and selected rehabilitation requirements. As funds become increasingly more available, it was obvious that the time has come to address some development issues to meet the needs of a rising population that requires better facilities ands aspire for better quality of life, in improved public transports, and roads, public playgrounds, parks, and other provisions that provide for a better quality of life in our region.

Issue # 4
Direct Procurement of Goods and Services

The United Nations Security Council has separated the rehabilitation of the “Three Northern Governorates” in the hands of the UN specialized agencies to carry out required rehabilitation works. However, a provision of the article requiring that the UN agencies execute the rehabilitation programs on behalf of the Iraqi authorities is a contradiction that has paralyzed the implementation of the humanitarian programs, especially in de-mining, electricity, and infrastructure. It has caused omissions, delays, and outright unjustified interference in the proposed rehabilitation programs designed for the areas under the authority of the KRG.

The Kurdish administration, during the past 10 years of successful administration of the Region, has proved that it can adequately address various rehabilitation issues, and can, in cooperation with the staff of the UN specialized agencies, successfully propose and implement required humanitarian programs. Further, we request that procurement issues be carried out through specific governmental departments of the Kurdish Administration. In this category we request that:

· The Government of Iraq should not be allowed to interfere in project proposals that are jointly prepared with the UN specialized agencies

· Procurement of required building material, UN and other technical staff, food and medicine, should be decided upon by the local Kurdish Administration, in unison with the UN agencies involved, as currently practiced in the Center and South of the country. We request that the same procedure be applied in the North to avoid current delays and inherent complications. Further, for convenience and speedy delivery of good ordered, the supplier should be given the choice as to the route it wishes to take to import such items.

· The UN staff should have a choice to enter the Kurdish Region from venues outside the jurisdiction of the Iraqi Government. At the same time, trainees should likewise have the same choice to leave for the training courses at points other than those set by the Iraqi authorities.

We would like to justify above requests on the following grounds:

· Prepared proposals by the KRG, under the Oil-for-Food Program (Phase Distribution Plans), have been delayed, altered or altogether omitted without justification

· Direct procurement will allow for faster project implementation; in the case of medicine, current procurement varies with the requirements of our region, and that food imports also lack sufficient quality control

· In case of staff and entry points, visas have been denied to qualified candidates without proper justification. (Electricity and de-mining expertise as examples). Furthermore, some of our trainees are reluctant to go through Iraqi points of exit due to earlier political records. This has limited selection of qualified candidates for proper training needs.

Issue # 5
The Capacity Building and the Idea of the “Common Roof”

The region’s isolation, and the migration of many qualifies staff, in addition to the need of maintaining a standard of quality among our local staff, it is important that we very seriously address the training needs of our local staff. We suggest that the UN special agencies prepare required timetable and the training needs of the concerned staff that should be budgeted for as a special sector in the upcoming phase allocation. The work would also involve institutional building for better organization, efficiency and economy in management.

In this connection and to engage the local technical staff in a more systematic manner in the implementation of the programs, and further, to more adequately address the training needs of the local staff, the idea of the common roof seems to be quite in order. Under this program, the specific UN agency joins hands with the concerned staff of the sector in active participation on a one to one basis in the ongoing implementation programs. Implementation of this idea has several advantages:

Projects are jointly implemented, giving the local staff a feeling of responsibility and partnership in project implementation.
It allows for the capacity building of the local staff as active participation in program implementation provides for required training needs.
Compensation of the local staff for their active participation in the implementation programs will improve to a certain extent the living standard of the local staff, making him more satisfied with his assignment and less prone to the idea of immigration.

Issue # 6.

Authority of the Local Agency Officer in Charge
Agency Officers in Charge of various agencies have limited power to approve projects or paying for minor expenditures required facilitating project implementation. This lack of authority has delayed project implementation activities. For every minor change of a project, renewed approval is sought which delays the works for weeks. Further, when the incumbent Officer in Charge goes on the R & R every activity comes to a standstill. In this process we lose vital time in project formulation as we have to wait for the main officer to return, and then even when he returns, his superior may be going on his R & R that will leave the issue outstanding for even a longer time. We request that persons left in charge of offices as acting officer should have all the authority that are enjoyed by the original officer. We hope that you raise this issue with relevant agencies to address the authority problem as required for efficient project implementation.

II. Specific Sector Issues
A. The Health Sector
The three agencies that are engaged in implementing projects under the health sector are the WHO, UNICEF, and HABITAT. Specific issues that need to be addressed are as follows:

The training program should be started and should be ongoing.
Our laboratories lack required reagents and culture media that are essential for diagnostic works; Ambulances ordered earlier are yet to be received;
Allow purchase of urgent needs from available “Cash Component”.
Designs for building of the 50- and 100-bed hospitals have been unnecessarily delayed.
Although the ancillary section of the 400-bed hospital has been started, building of the main complex is still in limbo.
UNICEF plans for bringing in the prefab structures for building the health centers have yet to be materialized.
UNICEF should more thoroughly cooperate with us in the area of pediatrics and maternity hospitals
HABITAT should speed up building of the staff houses and health clinics.
B. Higher Education
1. One of the most urgent issues that requires your immediate attention is the allocation of US $7.5 million, under Phase VII, Tranche II, for construction works that has yet to be released. We hope that you will do your best to release this fund so that our urgently required construction needs to be satisfied.

 

2. In this connection we also request speeding up of the plans for inviting required engineers and consultants to draw up the master plan for the new campus for the Sulaimani University. A sum of US $550,000 has already been allocated for this work under Phase VII, Tranche 2.

 

3. UNESCO also promised us to bring in specific teaching staff, either international or local (from the Center and South), with the academic standing of “Professors” or “Assistant Professors” to fill the existing gaps in our teaching capacity.

 

4. We are still awaiting the arrival of reference books and journals required by our teaching staff and the students. Adequate funds for this purpose have been allocated under various phases of the program.

 

5. We specifically suffer with the WHO, who have constantly undermined our requests, specifically in the following areas:

WHO has yet to address the construction needs of our medical facilities, including the construction of the medical institute at Chamchamal.
The agency has delayed discussion of projects and budgets presented on various health needs of the higher education.
WHO has kept budgetary allocation for health in an unnecessary secrecy, saying that UNESCO provides them with the budget for works needed in Higher Education. More transparency is required in our relationship with WHO staff.

C. The Agricultural Sector
Major issues to be addressed in this sector are as follows:

The issue of the agro-industries; unnecessary delays in releasing funds(possibly by UNOHCI-NY). We are still awaiting action on the following:
The slaughter house
The Silo
The small family silo
The Tomato Paste Plant
Moving of the Beni-Khelan Milk plant to Bakrajo.
The paste factory in Koya
Handing over of the Arbat Sunflower Factory

Along with the lack of action on the agro-industry, the issue of Management of such agro-industrial enterprises is pending. This perplexing issue has been raised as to who is the owner of such enterprises. We urgently request that the issue of the building of the agro-industries should not be delayed any further, and that management matters be resolved on the basis that after the six month trial period, the enterprise be handed over to the local authority, as the this authority is real, it exists, and has full jurisdiction on every item that is being built on its domain. To think otherwise is sheer ignoring of the facts and an insult to the integrity of the local authority.
We are still awaiting approval of the building of the Basara Dam that has been included in our Distribution Plan. We request that FAO engages in serious dialogue with the GOI to obtain the existing feasibility studies on the project, and if not available, plan forthwith for a new feasibility study and should prepare plans for required construction as soon as possible.
Since the duty station of the Program Manager is in Baghdad, we propose that he delegates part of his authority to his staff in Arbil and Sulaimani. Currently he alone holds the power of authority, and having his duty station in Baghdad makes it difficult for us to directly communicate with him. No other staff has been authorized to approve projects. We urge that this issue be seriously addressed.

D. The Municipality Sector
The Municipality sector carries out its activities through UNICEF, UNOPS/Sewage, and HABITAT. Outstanding issues of this sector with these agencies are as follows:

Delivery of equipment to the Municipality is considerably delayed. 7 Shovels and 14 dump trucks, 32 Garbage trucks are yet to be delivered, being kept for the past seven months in the Sulaimani UNICEF warehouse, awaiting registration by the GOI. This procedural matter must be reexamined to allow for local registration of equipment brought in under the 986 Program.
The municipality lacks sufficient conveyance pipes, 3 and four-inch pipes for water delivery. UNICEF is urged to speed up procuring these pipes, or allow for local procurement if delays are expected.
US $70 million has been allocated for UNOPS/Sewage which has yet to become active. If further delayed, we suggest allocating the funds to other agencies if UNOPS/Sewage is unable to utilize it soon.
HABITAT Agency has been engaged in building the IDP and other housing units without due consideration to complementary needs of sewage, electricity, water, etc. This has put much burden on the shoulders of the Municipality that is required to provide for such needs. It is suggested that HABITAT in its future activities should include the complementary requirements of housing project in its budgetary allocation.
We are now engaged in a dialogue with UNICEF to joining us in the provision of a better quality of life in our urban and semi-urban areas, through participation in a project addressing the sanitation of our cities and towns. A project has been prepared for this purpose. We request support to bring this project into realization.

E. The Rehabilitation Sector

The last consignments of equipment were delayed for 9 months, when such equipment was kept at HABITAT warehouse in Arbil, awaiting registration procedures. We request that this issue be addressed to find a suitable solution to the procedural needs of registration. This also applies to UNICEF, where delivery of such equipment is yet to be effected. A suggestion to the fact that such registration be temporarily handled locally, on the basis of which the equipment should be handed over to the sector while such registrations are being finalized by Baghdad.
We repeat out request to allow for more houses to be built on a self-built manner, whereby the building material is delivered to the beneficiary who will complete building his house under supervision of HABITAT engineers. This would be a more cost effective way of addressing required housing needs.
In order to speed up required construction works through provision of adequate building material we have requested that HABITAT engages in the procurement of brick making factory for this purpose.

F. The Education Sector

Our area still lacks sufficient schools, the number of students exceeding by far the number of schools available. Many of our schools work two or three shifts to provide sufficient space for the aspiring students. Further, due to the past-armed conflicts in the area that has been ongoing for over 30 years, we have a large number of adults who have missed out their schooling days whom are in need of a literacy program to teach them how to read and write. In one of our areas, the Garmian area that was subjected to severe government repression, 36% of the adults cannot read or write. This undesirable aspect of the population must be addressed and we request that relevant UN agencies will join us in our effort to repair damages done in the past that cause so many to miss out of their schooling days.

G. The Communication Sector

We have not seen much progress in this sector, in spite of the fact that the sector has been in place for the past two years. We are told that the Committee 661 may be withholding approval on this vital sector.
In the Transportation Sector we are told that there are 43 buses to be delivered to replace those dilapidated transport vehicles that have become the source of pollution and have affected city environment, in addition of being also a road hazard and a menace on the public highways.

We would appreciate initiating contacts to resolve these two important issues which will improve the quality of life of our citizens in the communication and transportation sectors.

H. Ministry Industry and Energy

In order to insure smooth running of the generators and electricity flow, and due to continued need of maintenance of electrical systems and distribution lines, a special sector need to be set up for this purpose.
Priority should be given to the establishment of electrical generators, such as gas turbines and steam generators are more reliable than the hydro electrical systems that are dependent of amounts of rainfall during the rainy season.
Training of our staff, both in the country and overseas, is urgently required to insure availability of trained technical staff. The idea of the common roof is part of this training exercise.
For project formulation and future plans, consultation with local authority is essential.
Setting up of the telecommunication capacity is essential for continuous monitoring of the electrical systems between the generating stations.
Other needs of office equipment and transport facilities are seen essential for work supervision and project implementation.
I. The Social Affairs
This is an important sector that has not been considered in the Distribution Plan as an independent sector. Requirements of this sector have been earlier included under the Health and the Education Sector. We request that, this being a vital sector that touches on the social affairs of the population, that a new sector be initiated in the forthcoming Distribution Plan, to be identified as The Social Affairs Sector. We may mention here that this sector exists in the Distribution plans prepared for the Center and South.

 

Appendix I
The Issue of Local Procurement

Introduction:

One of the drawbacks of the 986 –Oil-for- Food program is the provision that prohibits local procurement. This is especially hurting the agricultural sector, especially the Kurdish rural areas that have suffered a heavy blow under the Baathist regime during the 1980’s, when over 4500 villages were destroyed and their inhabitants were forcibly relocated to collective towns. Further an additional number, some 182,000 citizens lost their lives in the notorious Anfal Campaign during the mid eighties.

Village Rehabilitation

It is well known that agriculture is the mainstay of the Kurdish economy. The well being of its inhabitants is tightly connected with the development of its agriculture. The living standard of the Kurdish individual is heavily dependent on progress in agricultural fields. The employment status is also correlated with agricultural activities, decreasing when agricultural activities increase, and vice versa.

While the 986-Oil for Food program has been crucial for the saving of many lives at the start of the program, continuation of this policy of non-procurement of the agricultural products has been the stumbling block in the face of village rehabilitation and the return of the farmers to their original habitat.

 

Since the spring of 1997, close to US $2 billion has been used for the procurement of imported food items that have been locally available. For example, it defies the common logic of importing wheat from abroad when our own, locally produced wheat, cannot find a market, and therefore cannot be sold. We pay close to double of the price of a certain agricultural product for a relatively lower quality product of the same category that is being imported from abroad. One can but speculate of the positive changes that could have been made if local procurement was allowed and the amounts of funds spent for food import could have been used for the rehabilitation of the villages and provision of required infrastructure.

 

The Case of the Local Wheat

Rainfall during the current agricultural season, 2001-2002, has been above average, and, therefore, winter crops received its requirement of moisture that allowed for a bumper crop, especially for wheat. This being so, our wheat crop has been plentiful with an estimated total production of close to 700,000 tons of wheat. Estimated per-capita requirement of 10 kgs/month of wheat, for a population of about 4 million, will require a maximum about 500,000 tons of wheat, that can be procured locally. Based on this estimates, and after much debate and demands of the Kurdistan Regional Government, we were able to convince the Coordinator to open a dialogue on the possibility of procuring our needs of wheat from the local markets.

 

We were then delighted for the prospect of local procurement thinking that perhaps such procurement would be made directly by WFP, which is in charge of food distribution in our region, with payment in US dollars. Unfortunately, our hopes diminished when we were told that Baghdad would buy all the available wheat, using its printed money, the new Iraqi Dinars that are being circulated in the Center and South, with a fluctuating rate of exchange value ranging from 1US $= ID 1500 to ID 2000. When we requested that the fluctuation range be confined to a maximum of 3%, this suggestion was rejected. We could not accept the deal without a more or less fixed exchange rate. Our concern was that, when and if our 500, 000 tons sold, we will have close to New Printed Dinars 100, 0000,000, or Printed Dinars 100 Billion. Under the circumstances, we envisage that the printed Dinar value will become but a worthless piece of paper without value. Further, our suggestion to carry out the deal under a barter system, i.e., bring in manufactured items and equipment in lieu of the Dinar, is still pending.

Food Security
We feel that it is important to have a measure of food security whereby at least 50% of an annual requirement would be stored in the country for emergency need. This being the situation, it would be advisable to directly buy the wheat from the farmers, store it, and then keep it for emergency use, when and if hostilities flare up in the area.

Fund Availability:
The amount needed for the purchase of wheat, about US$ 50 million is a sum beyond the reach of the local two regional governments. Therefore the following two options are suggested:

Either the UN directly buys the wheat for use in the food basket, and then distributes it as required; or
A loan or direct fund is made available to the local government to be able to buy the wheat required for the food basket. We believe that addressing this issue in the most positive way would be a step in the right direction. The Kurdish rural community has been looking for a long time for a window of opportunity to improve the status of their rural economy. Purchasing of the local wheat for use in the food basket would be healthy shot in the arm.

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[1] Anfal, a term used in the Holy Quran, in reference to the infidels who deserved to be sternly punished.