WALTHAM, Mass. -- If the United States hopes to ensure a
functional postwar Iraq, it had better fully understand
the different sectarian and ethnic groups within the
country -- and their connections outside Iraq.
Since its creation in 1921, Iraq has been governed by a
Sunni Arab minority, which constitute less than 20% of the
country's population. The Sunnis felt entitled to rule
Iraq because they considered themselves the heirs of the
Ottoman Empire. Their claim to rule has been backed by the
preponderance of Sunnis over Shiites in the wider Arab
world and by the support of Arab Sunni leaders, including
the rulers of Saudi Arabia, who view Shiism as heresy and
have felt more comfortable with Sunni rule next door.
The policies of Western powers, especially those of the
United States, have bolstered Sunni rule in Iraq. Until
recently, the U.S. considered the Baath regime as a
counterweight to Shiite Iran. This was an important factor
in America's backing of Saddam Hussein during his
eight-year war with Iran and its decision not to aid Iraqi
Shiites when they rebelled against Hussein's regime in the
aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
Ignoring the Shiites was possible in 1991, when the U.S.
had limited designs for a regime change in Iraq. But it is
not possible now amid the downfall of the Baath regime.
The Bush administration will need to reach out to the
Shiite Arab majority, which represents 60% of the
country's population, while taking measures to ensure that
a change of regime in Iraq will not expose the Sunni
minority to Shiite revenge and tyranny.
The administration will also need to guarantee the
sociopolitical rights of the Kurds, who make up 20% of the
population, within a reunified Iraq and continue to
pressure Turkey to limit its activities in the northern
part of the country. The more leverage Turkey gains
through military intervention or political support of the
tiny Turkmen community in Iraq, the more leverage Iran
will inevitably seek by attempting to influence Shiite
affairs in the country. And the more Iran becomes
involved, the more influence Arab states will try to
exercise, by claiming to safeguard the interests of the
Sunni minority in Iraq.
During the transition period from U.S. military to Iraqi
civilian rule, it will be the Americans' responsibility to
institute some level of "de-Baathification," but there is
no need to completely shut Iraqi Sunnis out of a role in
the government. One initial step would be to take pains to
retain many of the civilian technocrats (who are
disproportionately Sunni) currently employed in the state
bureaucracy. Such a policy would signal to Iraqi Sunnis
that the downfall of the Baath regime was not intended to
strip them of power and would encourage them to have a
stake in a new Iraq.
Baghdad will likely remain the locus of Iraqi national
politics. But it is also in the center of the country,
which is where the Sunni minority is dominant. It will be
crucial, once oil fields are producing at capacity again,
to invest a large chunk of the oil proceeds in development
projects in the northern and southern regions, where oil
is found, and which in the past did not receive their fair
share of investment, in large part because the south is
predominantly Shiite while the north is dominated by the
Kurds.
Until political parties are formed and a national leader
elected, power could perhaps be shared by a triumvirate
representing each of Iraq's major sectarian and ethnic
groups. There could be, say, a Shiite president, a Sunni
prime minister and a Kurdish speaker of parliament. Their
roles should be constitutionally defined and endorsed by
the parliament, which, like the government, should also be
representative of Iraq's various social groups.
Iraq's main communities are likely to develop religious
and sociocultural institutions that would operate on the
principle of checks and balances. These institutions would
not necessarily reinforce sectarian and ethnic divisions,
but rather manage the competition among various groups
within each community and reduce tension among Shiites,
Sunnis and Kurds.
The question of whether Iraq could move, in the long run,
from a state governed by a confessional system -- whereby
sectarian and ethnic groups are represented according to a
predetermined ratio -- into one enjoying full democracy
will be determined primarily by the actions and wishes of
Iraqis themselves.
Arabs (Shiites and Sunnis) form some 75% of Iraq's
population. As the largest ethnic group, Iraqi Arabs would
need to offer the Kurds a pact safeguarding their
sociopolitical rights within a reunified Iraq. Both Iraqi
Arabs and Kurds have often referred to a 1970 accord
between Saddam Hussein and Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani
as a starting point. The accord acknowledged the Kurds'
distinct identity, allowed them to develop special
educational and cultural programs and recognized Kurdish,
alongside Arabic, as an official language in areas where
they formed a majority. The Kurds were also promised the
right to participate in the Iraqi government and
predominance in local administration.
In return for a similar offer backed by the United States
(and, preferably, also by the United Nations) after the
war, the Kurds would have to forge new links with their
Arab compatriots and undertake to resolve the Kurdish
problem within Iraq.
Ultimately, though, the key to Iraq's future will lie with
its Shiite majority, whose members form the backbone of
the secular intelligentsia and the middle class in Iraq.
Shiite political leadership will need to unite secularists
and Islamists, urban and rural dwellers, Shiites living
inside Iraq as well as those who will return from exile.
It must also be capable of reaching out to Iraq's
non-Shiite communities. Accomplishing these tasks may
enable a Shiite to emerge as a national leader recognized
by the majority of Iraqis.
The prospect of Shiites taking power should not raise the
fear that Iraq might be swept away by Islamic radicalism,
or that Iran would be able to increase its leverage in the
country to a significant extent. On the contrary, since
the 1991 Gulf War, radical Islam in the Middle East has
been largely shaped by Sunnis of the Hanbali-Wahhabi legal
school, whose hatred of America is rivaled only by their
distaste for Shiism. Although emboldened by the Iranian
revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has not remade
Arab Shiism in its own image. Indeed, a revival of the
Shiite academic center in Najaf would reinforce the
distinct identity of Arab Shiism and generate healthy
competition between that city and Qom, Iran, for the
leadership of the Shiite world.
The task of rebuilding a prosperous and politically stable
Iraq will be a challenging one, involving tough risks.
Down the road there could be a backlash against the wish
of the majority to bring decency and tolerance to Iraqi
sociopolitical life. It will be the responsibility of the
United States to help Iraqis achieve their desire for an
Iraq that serves all its people.
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