First, we need to stop pandering to the Sunni-Arab
minority that spawns terror and revels in atrocity.
Aspects of our occupation policy have been naively
one-sided - all carrot, no stick.
We need to have the guts to give at least one
terrorist haven a stern lesson as an example to the
others. Fallujah is the obvious choice.
If the populace continues to harbor our enemies and
the enemies of a healthy Iraqi state, we need to
impose strict martial law. Instead of lavishing
more development funds on the city - bribes that
aren't working - we need to cut back on electricity,
ration water, restrict access to the city and organize
food distribution through a ration card system. And we
need to occupy the city so thickly that the
inhabitants can't step out of their front doors
without bumping into an American soldier.
Don't worry about alienating the already alienated.
Make an example of them. Then see how the other cities
respond. Such an experiment would be expensive. But
strategic victories don't come cheap.
Iraq's Sunni Arabs need to master a simple
equation: If you support those who kill Americans,
there are penalties. If you cooperate to build a
better Iraq, there are rewards. We need contrasts
in Iraq between how we treat the deserving and the
murderous.
Unfair to the innocent? The current situation is
unfair to our soldiers and to the tens of millions of
Iraqis who want to build a secure, better future. As
long as the Sunni Arabs refuse to be part of the
solution, we need to recognize that they're the
problem - and treat them appropriately.
If the experiment works, expand it. If it fails,
abandon it and move on.
A great deal of nonsense has been spouted as to the
Sunni-Arab triangle being the "strategic high ground"
or the "center of gravity" in Iraq." That's simply
nonsense. The strategic high ground - literally - is
the Kurdish region in the north, while the human
center of gravity is the Shi'a majority in the south.
The Sunni Arabs are outflanked and outnumbered.
Their position is weak, not strong. We need to make it
plain to them that they will never again dominate the
other peoples of Iraq. Period.
A second, related step in building a just Iraq
would be to recognize Kurdish rights to the oil fields
of northern Iraq. They should be guarded by Kurds,
worked by Kurds and managed by Kurds, even if the
profits continue to be shared for now. It's absolute
folly to allow the disgruntled Sunni Arabs any control
over Iraq's prime resource just because Saddam gave it
to them.
Third, the "Iraqification" of security affairs is
not just smart, it's essential. But it has to be done
methodically, not in a pre-election rush.
Haste doesn't just make waste, it breeds strategic
failure. While the experimental recall of some Iraqi
army units is worth trying, it's essential not to take
shortcuts that simply return the Sunni-Arab minority
to power through a back door.
Fourth, as this column consistently has argued, we
need to make alternative plans for Iraq in case
attempts to build an integrated democracy fail.
The Sunni Arabs must understand that their
terrorism against us and against other Iraqis will
have severe consequences - including the division of
Iraq into three separate states: a Kurdish Republic in
the north that includes the northern oil fields; a
Shi'a state in the south that encompasses the southern
oil fields; and a disarmed, resource-poor Sunni Arab
state in the center. The international community would
protest. The international community always protests.
The more just and far-sighted our actions, the louder
the protests. Tough. Those who won't help now don't
get a vote tomorrow.
Which brings us to the fifth and final point:
Although the current situation suggests that a much
better Iraq will emerge from the wreckage of the old
order, we won't always have the resources or the right
environment for the occupation of states whose regimes
we need to defeat.
We're overdue to take a lesson from the Romans and
the British before us and recognize the value of
punitive expeditions. Should the Iraqis fail
themselves in the end, our current endeavor may prove
to have been simply a very expensive - but still
worthwhile - punitive expedition. Such an outcome
wouldn't mean that we failed, but that the
Iraqis had failed themselves.
One key lesson we should draw about expeditionary
warfare in the Age of Terror is that we need not feel
obliged to rebuild every government we are forced to
destroy. Sometimes the wise approach will be to employ
our military power to topple a regime, then to
withdraw promptly and let the local population sort
themselves out. We should always seek to be as humane
as possible - but the key word is "possible."
Exemplary punishment may be out of fashion, but
it's one of the most enduringly effective tools of
statecraft. Where you cannot be loved, be feared.
Indeed, a classic punitive expedition may prove to
be the perfect model for Syria.
Ralph Peters' latest book is "Beyond Baghdad:
Postmodern War and Peace."
NEW YORK POST November 5, 2003
