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Prof. Cornel West on the Kurdish people:
-
Muslims With Secular
Democracy
-
Victims of Saddam's
Gangsterism and Gassing
-
Source of Important
Model and Inspiration for the Middle East
-
U.S. & Britain Deserve
Credit for Protecting the Kurds
-
Curtailing Kurdish
Autonomy Not a Good Thing & Will
Further Destabilize Iraq
-
Is the U.S. Protection
of the Kurds Based on Principle or Geostrategic
Considerations?
-
21st Century Will See
Much More Focus on the Kurdish Issue
-
The Plight of the
Kurdish People Requires Crucial Focus on the Part
of the American People
Cornel West
(Ph.D., Princeton) returned to Princeton in 2002 as
Class of 1943 University Professor of Religion. His
teaching and research interests include philosophy of
religion and cultural criticism, and his current
research focuses on the tragic, the comic, and the
political. He is the author of numerous articles and
books including The American Evasion of Philosophy:
A Genealogy of Pragmatism, The Cornel West
Reader and Race Matters.
POLITICS,
TRANSITION, AND THE KURDS
EYEWITNESS PERSPECTIVES ASSESSING PROGRESS IN IRAQ
(PART II)
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP)
By SONER CAGAPTAY
February 12, 2004
On February 9, 2004, Patrick Clawson, Soner Cagaptay,
Jeffrey White, and Jonathan Schanzer addressed The
Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum. All
four were part of the Institute fact-finding
delegation tasked with conducting an independent
survey of local security conditions and emerging
political currents in Iraq. The delegation traveled
throughout Iraq, from the Turkish border to the
Kuwaiti frontier, speaking with Coalition
Provisional Authority officials, coalition military
leaders, Iraqi Governing Council members, and Iraqi
clerics, tribal leaders, and intellectuals. Mr.
Cagaptay is coordinator of the Institute's Turkish
Research Program. The following is a rapporteur's
summary of his remarks:
Northern Iraq
The Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq
already has the trappings of independent statehood,
and the Kurds will look to maintain as many of them
as possible. Among the most important of these
trappings are control over borders, militia forces,
and finances. For example, the Kirkuk area alone
holds about 40 percent of Iraq's oil. If the Kurds
have control over this oil, they will effectively
become the holders of the world's ninth largest oil
reserves.
In general, Kurdish officials are prepared to accept
federal status for Iraqi Kurds with two caveats. The
first is that laws passed in Baghdad cannot
contradict Kurdish laws or secularism. Some Kurdish
officials have been adamant on that position. The
second caveat is that Iraq should be organized as a
binational state of Kurds and Arabs. Over the next
year, Kurdish authorities will likely pursue two
strategies in order to ensure that these conditions
are met. First, they may resist calls for holding
Iraqi elections soon, preferring that national
elections be held one or two years down the road.
Kurdish authorities already have a large sphere of
influence, and elections could undermine some of
their control, given that they represent a minority
in Iraq.
Second, they will try to maintain de facto control
over as much of the north-central region as they can
during the transitional period. This region
stretches from the Syrian border to the Iranian
border and includes the cities of Mosul, Irbil, and
Kirkuk. It is the only area (other than Baghdad)
where all of Iraq's various ethnic groups -- from
Turkmens, Arabs, and Kurds to Shi'ites, Sunnis, and
Muslims -- "coexist in significant numbers (the
south is 90 percent Shi'i, if not more; the far
north and northeast are heavily Kurdish; the central
region and the western desert are overwhelmingly
Sunni). North-central Iraq contains ethnic enclaves
within enclaves and is the only area where no group
enjoys plurality across the board. Despite its
diversity, much of the area is currently controlled
by the Kurds, whose checkpoints stretch as far south
as an hourâ?Ts drive north of Baghdad. Hence, if
Iraq does fracture, it will do so because of
developments in the north-central region.
Despite their currently extensive reach, it is
uncertain whether the Kurds will retain this level
of influence in the long term. The Kurds have
maintained a maximalist agenda in part to ensure
that they have a strong hand when they begin
bargaining with the rest of the country. Afterward,
they may in due course give up some of their gains.
In particular, they may be willing to give Baghdad
control over their borders and integrate the
Peshmerga militias into the Iraqi army.
Turkey and the Kurds: Natural Political Allies
Iraqi Kurds and Turks can become close political
allies if they can overcome their political
differences in the short run. Given the large
Kurdish population in Turkey, Turks view the Kurds
as a part of the Turkish family. Moreover, as a
country on the brink of European Union membership,
Turkey is a natural passageway to the Western world
for the Kurds, whose largely secular political
culture mirrors Turkeyâ?Ts own. In fact, the Kurds
are the most potent secular force in Iraq, which
fact will put them squarely in Ankara's camp when it
comes to maintaining a secular Iraqi political
culture. Water will be another key issue binding
Turks and Kurds. Turkey has long held the most
favorable upstream position with regard to water
rights in the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. In the
new Iraq, however, the Kurds will join Turkey as
another upstream power, given their control over the
mountainous north. Hence, if negotiations on
regional water issues are held in the near future,
Syria and Iraq, the two downstream countries, will
be sitting on one side of the table, with Turkey and
the Iraqi Kurds on the other side.
This Special Policy Forum Report was prepared by
Jeff Cary, a Dr. Marcia Robbins-Wilf young scholar
and research assistant at The Washington Institute,
and by Ryan Phillips, also a research assistant at
the Institute.
