Opinion
Turks aim
to keep Kurds at precipice
By Maggy Zanger
Special to the
Arizona Daily Star
Tucson, Arizona | Published: 03.09.2008
The international community breathed a
collective sign of relief recently when
Turkey withdrew its tanks and troops
after an eight-day incursion to rout the
guerrilla fighters of a Turkish Kurdish
group from their snow packed bases in
the rugged mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan.
The Turkish action was, after all,
pregnant with the possibility of
spinning out of control and into a
larger regional conflict, possibly
involving Iran and Syria in addition to
Turkey and Iraq, all countries with
large Kurdish minorities.
But it's early to breathe easy. For the
Turks, this short-lived offensive may
well have been a precedent-setting trial
run for another go at the Kurdistan
Worker's Party (PKK) when the political
climate and the weather are more
advantageous.
The top Turkish general made this clear.
"There are further lessons that we need
to teach," said Ya_ar Büyükanıt, head of
armed forces at a press briefing a few
days after the withdrawal, according to
the Associated Press. "There will be
operations when needed. We will
continue."
The point is that they need to continue.
The Turks were not looking for final
solutions in February. They need ongoing
conflict with the PKK for two vital
reasons. While the PKK is certainly a
thorn in the side of the military — the
real political power in Turkey — the
Kurdish "terrorist threat" provides the
Turkish military with its raison d'être;
a compelling reason for its bloated
budgets.
More significantly, PKK bases in Iraqi
Kurdistan have provided and continue to
provide the Turks with a pretext to
interfere in Iraqi Kurdistan and
encourage its destabilization.
In the long term, the Turks are far less
concerned about a couple of thousand, at
most, ragtag guerrilla fighters than
they are about the successful "Iraqi
model." The Kurdistan Region, a
federally recognized political entity in
Iraq, offers the long-oppressed Kurdish
minority in Turkey a political
arrangement to emulate.
The Kurdish problem
Turkey, like neighboring Iraq, Iran and
Syria, has struggled with the "Kurdish
Problem" since the end of World War I.
When the European powers dismantled the
Ottoman Empire and drew lines on a map
forming new nation- states, the Kurds,
who had been assured they would have
their own country, found themselves
divided among new countries dominated by
ethnic Persians in Iran, Turks in
Turkey, and Arabs in Iraq and Syria.
As large minorities in each of those
countries, the fiercely independent
Kurds were viewed by various weak and
unstable governments as a threat to the
consolidation of the nation-state. They
were seen, at best, as an unruly ethnic
group to be brought under control, and
at worst, in Iraq for example, as a
people so threatening as to be
eradicated by genocide.
Accurate population statistics in these
four countries are difficult to
ascertain as censuses are rarely taken
and numbers are often inflated or
deflated for political reasons, but the
Kurds constitute approximately 20
percent of the population in Turkey and
Iraq, 10 to 15 percent in Iran, and
perhaps 10 percent in Syria.
In all four countries, since the 1920s,
there have been varying degrees of
purposeful underdevelopment of Kurdish
areas, suppression of Kurdish cultural
expression, mass arrests and executions,
population and land transfers, and
extensive destruction of centuries-old
Kurdish villages and towns.
In Turkey for example, even the
existence of the Kurds was denied. They
were called Mountain Turks by the
virulent nationalists who forged the
modern Turkish nation, led by Mustafa
Kamel Ataturk. With the formation of the
republic, the Kurdish language,
publications and organizations were
banned and cultural expression denied.
The Kurds had for centuries defended
themselves in their mountain refuge from
an endless stream of invaders, and
continued to resist their cultural
demise in the modern era. In all four
countries, the 1900s were a time of
cyclical state suppression of Kurdish
rights, followed by Kurdish rebellion,
followed by severe government
repression.
Only recently has the Kurdish language
been heard in broadcasts in Turkey — and
then rarely and only because Turkey
desperately wants to join the European
Union and is under enormous pressure to
clean up its human rights act in
relation to the Kurds.
The Iraqi model
The Kurds today are the largest ethnic
group in the world without a state of
their own. The "Kurdish problem," the
desire for self-determination, festers
to this day in Turkey, Syria and Iran
and has been fueled in the past few
years by the success of the Iraqi Kurds
in forging an autonomous region within
their country.
In the wake of the 2003 U.S. invasion,
Iraqi Kurds have managed to make a
representative place for themselves at
the national table and have negotiated
constitutional guarantees to form an
autonomous regional government. They
have their own flag, elect their own
members of a regional parliament, have
their own police, security and
intelligence forces, and are
experiencing an economic boom as the
only safe place to do business in Iraq.
Kurds in neighboring countries are
inspired by what they call the "Iraqi
model." If the Iraqi Kurds can rise from
the ashes of genocide in the late 1980s
to legitimate self-rule some 15 years
later, why can't they?
"It is considered a model," Abdullah
Mohtadi, leader of an Iranian Kurdish
group in exile in Iraqi Kurdistan, told
me this summer. "Things can change."
It is this model that the Turks are most
anxious about.
They surely understand by now that they
cannot militarily defeat the PKK
guerrillas, wherever they are. The
Turkish military fought a brutal
campaign against the group in the 1990s
in southeast Turkey that left as many as
3,000 Kurdish villages destroyed, 2
million Kurds displaced, and perhaps
35,000 people, mostly Kurds, dead.
Kurdish efforts to participate in the
political process were generally viewed
as subversive and elected Kurds were
assassinated, jailed or forced to flee
the country.
Although it is painfully obvious that a
political solution with the PKK and the
Kurds of Turkey in general is the only
feasible option, the generals pursue the
military one. PKK "terrorist" bases in
Iraq give them a pretext to interfere
with the success of the Iraqi model.
Turkey has tested the waters with the
eight-day war and found them to be
temperate. The generals now know the
international community will easily
tolerate a short offensive in
neighboring Iraq in the name of national
security. Expect more in the future with
artillery shelling and aerial bombing in
between.
This type of low-intensity warfare in
"pursuit of terrorists" will keep the
Americans and the Europeans at bay, and
will keep the Iraqi Kurds on the edge of
a chaotic precipice — right where the
Turks want them.
E-mail Maggy Zanger at zanger@email.arizona.edu