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Op-Ed Contributor
Keeping Iraq in the
Dark
By GLENN ZORPETTE
Published: March 11,
2008
Correction Appended
LACK of electricity
is still a big
problem in Iraq, and
there’s lots of
blame to go around.
Much of it goes to
the usual suspects:
too many insurgent
attacks, too few
experienced
engineers and
technicians. But
there’s another
factor, big and
getting bigger,
which you probably
haven’t read about.
It’s one that Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki
and his bureaucrats
could solve quickly,
if they wanted to:
Iraq’s Ministries of
Oil and Electricity
are at loggerheads.
While they bicker,
Iraqis seethe.
During a cold snap
this January in
Iraq, I spent a
morning interviewing
people on the
streets of Falluja.
Over and over again,
I heard variations
on two basic themes:
appreciation that
the coalition had
driven the
insurgents out of
town, and anger over
the inability of
their government,
with American
assistance, to
provide them with
more than an hour or
two of electricity
each day.
The number of hours
may vary, but much
the same complaint
can be heard just
about anywhere in
Iraq. Electricity
remains a
dispiritingly scarce
commodity, even
though more than $6
billion, mostly in
American money, has
been devoted to
improving supply.
From an encouraging
peak of 5,530
megawatts last July
11, typical daily
peaks have slipped
back to around 4,500
megawatts, according
to a recent report
by the Special
Inspector General
for Iraq
Reconstruction.
That’s only about
500 megawatts more
than what it was
shortly after the
start of
reconstruction five
years ago — before
the completion of
thousands of
American-supported
projects. Summer
peak demand in the
country will be at
least 11,000
megawatts, the State
Department
estimates.
While the insurgency
is of course a major
factor, the heart of
the matter is that
the Oil and
Electricity
Ministries have
coexisted uneasily
ever since they were
reconstituted by the
Coalition
Provisional
Authority in 2003.
To run its
generating plants,
the cash-starved
Electricity Ministry
must beg for
whatever fuel the
Oil Ministry can
spare, while buying
as much as it can
from places like
Kuwait. But charity
isn’t a priority for
Iraq’s Oil Ministry
— quite the
contrary.
Almost all of the
Iraqi government’s
revenues come from
oil exports. They
totaled $39.8
billion last year,
the government says,
accounting for about
95 percent of its
income. So it is not
surprising that the
oil minister,
Hussain al-Shahristani,
has been acting as
though every barrel
not exported is
money wasted.
But that attitude,
and the tacit
approval of Prime
Minister Maliki, is
helping to prolong
the economic, social
and security
quagmires that
continue to afflict
the country. All
over Iraq,
generating plants
sit idle for lack of
fuel. The State
Department estimates
that on a typical
day about 1,500
megawatts of power,
or one-third of the
country’s peak
output, are
unavailable because
the Electricity
Ministry cannot get
enough fuel. While
the Oil Ministry
mechanistically
swells the
government coffers,
hospitals,
water-pumping
stations and sewage
systems function
sporadically or not
at all. The Oil
Ministry’s
intransigence goes
beyond fuel
parsimony. It also
refuses to pay for
any projects that do
not help in
exporting more crude
oil. “The Oil
Ministry has done
zero projects to
benefit
electricity,” an
American diplomat in
Baghdad told me.
“They couldn’t care
less.”
Reconstruction
experts at the
American Embassy in
Baghdad pointed to a
dozen proposed oil
projects that could
make a big
difference in the
electricity supply.
One is the repair
and renovation of
the pipeline that
brings crude from
the southern oil
fields to the Doura
refinery in Baghdad,
which is the
nation’s largest
producer of kerosene
and gasoline.
A
branch of this
pipeline also feeds
the Musayyib power
plant, south of the
capital. Workers
there are now
finishing a $50
million structure,
called a topping
unit, to produce
diesel fuel for 10
new
turbine-generators.
Unfortunately, the
troubled project to
buy and install
those generators has
dragged on for years
and has cost
American taxpayers
$36 million so far.
Only four of the
generators are ready
to operate, but even
they sit idle for
lack of fuel.
A few
more generators are
expected to be ready
in the next couple
of months, but the
pipeline still won’t
be capable of
delivering enough
crude oil for
conversion into
diesel at the
topping unit to run
the generators. To
allow this to
happen, the pipeline
would need an
additional pumping
station and some
general
refurbishing. The
cost would be very
small compared to
the money already
invested at Musayyib,
or compared to
alternative fueling
schemes like
bringing in diesel
fuel in convoys of
dozens of tanker
trucks every day.
But the Oil Ministry
refuses to modernize
the pipeline’s
pumping system at
all, because it
wants the oil
flowing south for
export, not north
for the people of
Baghdad.
Meanwhile, at the
big Qudas power
station north of the
capital, workers are
adding two new
generating units to
the eight already
installed. There’s
an old oil field
literally across the
street from Qudas
that now pumps
enough crude-oil
distillate to supply
three of the plant’s
generating units;
the other units,
however, rely on
fuel being trucked
in. It would cost an
estimated $50
million to
rehabilitate enough
of the fields’ aging
wells and equipment
to supply enough
crude, diesel and
gas sufficient to
fuel 7 of the 10
generating units
that Qudas will soon
have. Consultants
from the American
engineering firm
Fluor estimate that
the cost savings
from no longer
having to truck in
the crude would
recoup the $50
million expense in
about a month. But,
here, too, the Oil
Ministry isn’t
interested. “They
have no dog in that
fight,” an embassy
official told me.
“There’s no way for
them to make money
out of it.”
Perhaps the biggest
waste of all in Iraq
involves not oil but
natural gas, an
enormous resource
squandered literally
all the time. It
comes out of the
ground along with
oil, and is simply
burned off, or
“flared,” to prevent
it from exploding.
Yet several studies
have concluded that
if the gas from the
southern oil fields
alone were used to
generate
electricity, it
could provide 4,100
megawatts, nearly
doubling Iraq’s
total capacity.
Nevertheless, the
Oil Ministry has
pushed back on every
Electricity Ministry
proposal over the
past five years
aimed at capturing
and delivering the
gas to generating
plants.
Not only the two
ministries are at
odds with each
other, their leaders
are as well,
American diplomats
tell me. The oil
minister, Mr.
Shahristani, was
trained as a
chemical engineer,
worked as a nuclear
specialist and spent
years in Saddam
Hussein’s prisons —
but he had no
experience in the
oil industry before
his appointment. He
is, however, very
well connected with
the Supreme Council
for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq,
the country’s
dominant Shiite
political party.
Meanwhile, the
electricity
minister, Karim al-Hasan,
holds a Ph.D. in
electrical
engineering and came
up through the ranks
of the ministry,
which gives him
great expertise but
little political
sway.
Efforts to bring
coherence and
compromise to Iraq’s
energy ministries
have been sparse and
fruitless. A
multi-ministry
“energy-fusion cell”
was set up nearly a
year ago to work
with the Pentagon
and State Department
on an integrated
energy plan, but
this has gone
nowhere. One
promising note: the
Iraqi government’s
new agreement on
sharing oil
resources among
regions apparently
has language
mandating that the
government stop
flaring its natural
gas and start
capturing and using
it.
Iraq has some of the
world’s largest
known oil reserves,
but it spent nearly
a billion dollars
importing oil
products last year.
That’s not the only
paradox. Iraqis are
experiencing the
unfortunate results
of the United
States’ failure to
anticipate and
accommodate the fuel
requirements of the
three dozen
generating units it
installed early
during
reconstruction. But
sadly, thanks to
bureaucratic
infighting and an
obsession with
export revenue,
their own government
is now on a path to
institutionalize and
perpetuate those
energy problems
indefinitely.
Glenn Zorpette
is the executive
editor of
I.E.E.E.
Spectrum, the
magazine of the
Institute of
Electrical and
Electronics
Engineers.
This article has
been revised to
reflect the
following
correction:
Correction:
March 14, 2008
An Op-Ed article
on Tuesday,
about Iraq’s
electricity
shortage,
incorrectly
described the
financing for
the Musayyib
power plant,
south of
Baghdad. The
United States
has provided $36
million so far,
the Pentagon
says; it has not
contributed more
than $300
million, which
is the amount
spent by the
government of
Iraq.
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